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Klarman.1 Oxford University Press. 2016. PP. xii + 865. 
$39.95 (hardcover). 
Frank I. Michelman2 
“I got no dog in that fight” —Anon. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. KLARMAN’S DOG? 
A tonic to the mind is The Framers’ Coup, Michael J. 
Klarman’s imposing new investigative report on the great 
American founding. Formally (and formidably), the book stands 
as a contribution to scholarly researches in United States history 
and the politics of laws. But of course it carries cues and messages, 
too, for all who would expound or instruct upon the Constitution’s 
place in American life and politics. For this is not a tale simply of 
coup d’etat, of triumph “by one party in a debate that genuinely 
had two sides” (p. 5). It is also a close and expert study of 
complexities—ambiguities, accidents, miscalculations, 
confusions, contradictions and reversals—in the lining up, 
sometimes sooner, sometimes later, of delegates at Philadelphia 
behind one or another article of constitutional text, and of state 
conventions behind the whole shebang. 
As a first consequence: When, predictably in times to come, 
we see Klarman’s researches getting caught up in tangles of law-
office history,3 it will not be his fault. Neither can it be his wish, 
 
 1. Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 2. Robert Walmsley University Professor, Emeritus, Harvard University. 
 3. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119, 123 n.13 (“By ‘law-office’ history, I mean the selection of data favorable to the position 
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because Klarman is an avowed foe of originalist-minded 
constitutional application.4 Any sight of his pages being 
rummaged and sacked by lawyers and judges out for proofs of 
neatly amberized framers’ intents and original public meanings 
will be for him, we must assume, a cause of chagrin. 
Still, if you were looking for some present-day political fight 
in which Coup has its intended dog, you might easily find one—
not that Klarman ever tells you directly what it is. He has pretty 
much, in this present text (the contrast, as we will see, is with some 
earlier writings of Klarman’s on the topic of American 
constitutional devotion) kept clear of normative overhangs, 
preferring to let his history speak for itself toward whatever 
actions or postures in response it might move his readers to take 
up. His closest approach to the pulpit comes at the close of the 
book’s lead-off chapter, where Klarman prompts readers to 
consider how they should “think” and “feel” about constitutional 
provisions (he anticipates here some of what his pending 
historical account will show) 
continuing to bind Americans today despite their inconsistency 
with modern democratic norms? More generally, how should 
one feel about a modern democratic society’s being governed 
by a [virtually non-amendable] constitution that was written 
225 years ago by people possessed of very different 
assumptions, concerns, and values [from those today 
prevailing]? (pp. 9-10). 
How we should feel is the aim of the jab, not what we should 
do. At no point does the book speak directly—as some other 
worried contemporary authors do—to the question of what steps 
we should think of taking in response to this situation, about 
which we presumably are meant to feel not good. 
 
being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation 
of the relevance of the data proffered.”). 
 4. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1915 (1995) (“No originalist 
thinker of whom I am aware has convincingly explained why the present generation should 
be ruled from the grave.”); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political 
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 770 (1991) (“[O]ne must wonder why the current 
generation should consent to be ruled on critical questions of government policy by the 
constitutional choices of persons dead almost two hundred years who. . . inhabited a 
radically different world.”). 
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B. A FRAMING ON CLAY FEET 
Compare the example set by Sanford Levinson. Having 
charted at length and detail the defects that block his 
endorsement of the Constitution as one that Americans today in 
their right minds could adopt as truly fit to govern their affairs,5 
Levinson issues a call for corrective action of a kind that still 
maintains a thread of constitutional attachment, to wit, a 
campaign of petitioning to Congress to exercise a constitutionally 
vested responsibility to call, when and as the times may require, a 
national convention “to assess the adequacy of the . . . 
Constitution to our . . . needs.”6 
The Framer’s Coup might perfectly well have been drafted as 
a brief in support of exactly such a cry to the country for a national 
project of major constitutional repair. Viewed thus, the book’s 
particular input would be more in the line of replication than case-
in-chief.  “[T]hroughout American history,” as Klarman reminds 
us early on, “political actors have invoked the wisdom and virtue 
of the Framers as arguments against constitutional change” (pp. 
4-5). His work in Coup seems perfectly designed to cut the ground 
from under that sort of resistance against meddling with the 
wisdom of historical framers deemed better situated, better able, 
or better motivated than us to call the shots correctly for the long 
run. The facts assembled and presented here about the values,7 
 
 5. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) 
(recalling his rejection of the National Constitution Center’s invitation to “re-sign” the 
Constitution, while explaining that this choice does “not necessarily mean that I would 
have preferred that the Constitution go down to defeat in the ratification votes of 1787-
88”). 
 6. Id. at 173–74; see U.S. CONST. art. V (directing Congress to “call a convention to 
propose amendments” for ratification by three-fourths of the states upon application 
therefor by two thirds of the states). Levinson joins with the suggestion of Akhil Amar that 
Article V can be read to envisage a congressional convention call without applications 
from the states, and furthermore to allow for ratification of convention handiwork by a 
single nationwide majority vote. See id. at 174, 177; see also Akhil Amar, Philadelphia 
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV 1043, 1054 
(1988) (reading Article V to provide channels for constitutional amendment by 
government action but not to exclude amendment by “appeals to the People themselves”). 
 7. Klarman reverts throughout to the Framers’ elitist approach to politics, out of 
keeping, as he suggests, with the modern American democratic temper (e.g., pp. 606-609), 
starting with a contempt on the Framers’ part for the ability of their own contemporaries 
at large “to intelligently rule themselves” (p. 4). 
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aims,8 beliefs,9 tactics,10 and strategies11 of those who took 
controlling parts in the Constitution-making process, or about 
general hazards to rationality affecting the process as a whole,12 
or about the role in these events of sheer accident and luck,13 seem 
designed to counter any lingering dispositions toward 
“‘sanctimonious reverence’” for the outcome.14 The Framers’ 
Coup shines its light on the Framing’s seamier side, its face of 
ordinary politics. Without denying the Framers their reputations 
for exceptional intelligence, statecraft, and patriotism, the book 
 
 8. Coup takes repeated note of how, in the founding negotiations, “interests” (of 
class or section) took precedence over “ideas” (of public weal and good government) (p. 
7), and of how crucial parts in the emerging constitutional blueprint were outcomes of  
“compromise,” not “principle” (pp. 6, 153; see p. 541, describing small state acceptance of 
strong national powers in exchange for equal representation in Senate; pp. 291-296, 
describing a “package deal” by which Southern delegates accept a national commercial 
power in exchange for protection of slavery). 
 9. A chief example here would be the framers’ failure to foresee, although it was 
right at their doorstep, the rise of organized political-party competition as the engine of 
American electoral contestation, with disastrous results both for the framers’ calculations 
of the ease of amendment as scripted by Article V (pp. 316-317), and their expectations 
regarding benign effects of cross-branch political conflict (p. 629). 
 10. Klarman refers to use of extremist proposals and scare tactics to elicit preferred 
outcomes (pp. 6-7, on threats of walkouts; p. 534, on questionable sincerity of warnings by 
Federalists of civil war in case of non-ratification). He shows other prevarications by 
delegates regarding true intentions (p. 237, on suspected ulterior motive for a small-state 
delegate’s preference of the Senate over the Supreme Court as trier of impeachments; p. 
609, on Federalist use at ratification of justifications for controversial features that differed 
from their arguments at Philadelphia). 
 11. Examples would include Article VII’s switching of the ground rules for 
ratification away from unanimity of the states (p. 8), and maneuvering by Federalists (as 
by resistance against conditional ratifications and “antecedent amendments”) to confront 
voters at the ratification stage with a rigidly binary choice between “the obviously defective 
Articles of Confederation” and a “vastly more nationalist and democracy-constraining 
Constitution” than most voters likely would have wanted (pp. 8, 533, 536, 545, 611-612). 
 12. The hazards include effects on key votes and actions of personal and partisan 
animosities and paybacks (pp. 428-429, 472 n.*, 560); distraction of delegations by short-
term from longer-term considerations (pp. 426, see p. 615, on Georgia’s quick ratification 
in fear of abandonment by the union in immediately pending Indian wars, and hasty action 
by mid-Atlantic states in hopes of housing the national capital city); influence of path 
dependencies, availability and anchoring heuristics, and cascade effects (pp. 605-606; see 
p. 6: “A constitution written in the years before Shays’ Rebellion and the enactment [in 
the states] of populist relief legislation . . . probably would have looked very different 
. . . .”), including successive effects of state ratifications on other states (pp. 430–431, 452, 
485, 540–544). 
 13. See pp. 406-411, describing various off-the-merits advantages enjoyed by the 
Federalist side at ratification; pp. 540, 596, noting very slight margins of victory in several 
states; pp. 542-549, noting possibly outcome-determinative contingencies in the timing of 
various state ratification votes; and p. 620, noting lucky effect of the coincidence of a 
“surging economy” at the time of the ratification votes. 
 14. P. 631, quoting, of course, Thomas Jefferson. 
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stands as a takedown of the Framing from any high pedestal of 
reverence it may hitherto have occupied in the minds of readers.15 
The work thus incidentally also serves as a response to other 
reasons sometimes heard against upending ancient laws, such as a 
need of the community to maintain its identity or integrity or 
confidence through time, or an obligation of respect owed by 
posterity to ancestors. And that, indeed, is the note on which the 
book ends: 
That [the Constitution] has been around for a long time or that 
its authors were especially wise and virtuous should not be 
sufficient to immunize it against criticism. . . . As Jefferson 
would have recognized, those who wish to sanctify the 
Constitution are often using it to defend some particular 
interest that, in their own day, cannot be adequately justified 
on its own merits (p. 631). 
So there, in sum is one perfectly plausible attribution of a 
fight in which Klarman has entered his dog: to wit, a nascent 
agitation for major constitutional repair, perhaps by way of a new 
constitutional convention. 
C. ANTIFIDELITY? 
I bring up now a rather different, more radical possible 
attribution. Klarman’s dog could not, as I have said, be any 
preference of his over specific applications of constitutional 
clauses. But what about an exactly opposite kind of preference? I 
have in mind an agitation (which does occasionally make it into 
the op-ed zone of current American awareness)16 over the very 
constitutional faith that makes those applications seem to matter 
in our lives in the way that they do. Coup could plausibly be meant 
for service in a project of detox of American politics from this not-
so-minor tic by which the Constitution is allowed, or is imagined, 
to stand as sovereign guide to policy and law.17 
 
 15. “The men who wrote the Constitution were extremely impressive, but they were 
not demigods . . . .” (p. 5). 
 16. See Louis Michael Seidman, Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
30, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/opinion/lets-give-up-on-the-constitution.ht
ml (an op-ed piece naming as the chief culprit in American political dysfunction “our 
insistence on obedience to the Constitution”). 
 17. See Michael J. Klarman, What’s so Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. L. 
REV. 145, 155 (1998) [hereinafter Klarman, Constitutionalism] (pointing to tension 
between the idea of the Constitution as our national act of precommitment to a distinct set 
of values and ideals and our experience of the indeterminacy of application to concrete 
controversies of many of its key clauses); id. at 169 (suggesting that the same indeterminacy 
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Such thoughts will come easily to anyone on terms with 
Klarman’s earlier writings on this topic of American 
constitutional devotion. Our author has in the past stood out from 
the crowd of American constitutional-legal academics for the 
nerve and verve of scholarship of declared Constitution-resistant 
leanings.18 These older works of Klarman’s were addressed largely 
to the question of what he called “judicially enforceable” 
constitutionalism, as distinct from a broader Constitution-
skeptical stance as above defined.19 But they contain plenty of 
more broadly anticonstitutional fodder, too, as I shall be showing 
below. As Klarman has said, “constitutionalism without judicial 
review shares many of the virtues and vices of its judicially-
enforceable variety.”20 
The concession of virtues should not be overlooked; we will 
get back to it. It has not kept Klarman in the past from proposing 
seriously to Americans, as our path of escape from a choice 
deemed unacceptable, between rule from eighteenth-century 
graveyards and rule by electorally untethered judges doing on-
the-fly, to-suit-themselves constitutional reconstruction, that “we 
can simply be anticonstitutionalists. That is, we can decide 
controverted policy questions for ourselves through political 
struggle (as much of the rest of the world does it), rather than 
through the edicts of long-dead Framers or relatively 
unaccountable judges.”21 
“Anticonstitutionalist” (as you see) was one name Klarman 
had for that option. “Antifidelity” was another.22 He did not in 
that place actually sign on the dotted line for party membership 
under either name, nor has he since then done so that I know of. 
But neither has he retracted the suggestion, and now comes Coup, 
bearing on its face what may easily be read as express incitement 
to Constitution-resisting deductions, those leading questions to 
 
means that often “the real ground of controversy is over what we think should be done”). 
 18. A few titles tell the tale. See Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17; Michael 
J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997) [hereinafter Klarman, Antifidelity]; 
Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1739 (1997). Klarman has had L. M. Seidman for company, see 
Seidman, supra note 16; LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
 19. See Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 146 (asserting a “principal” 
concern with “constitutionalism . . . [in] its judicially-enforceable” form). 
 20. Id. at 146. 
 21. Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 18, at 411–12. 
 22. By his title for the article proclaiming it, see id. 
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readers to which I have already directed attention. Should we 
read them as a call to Antifidelity? 
I am going to doubt it. Setting the Framing on clay feet is one 
thing; a call for ejection of the resulting Constitution from its place 
of providing, while it stands, a basic law for the country is quite 
another thing. The second thing is not logically deducible from the 
first; and while Klarman plainly does mean for his history to do 
the first thing, his book—to my eye, anyway—stops noticeably 
short of the second. There may even be reason to think that it does 
so partly as a result of Klarman’s experience in researching and 
writing this treasure of scholarship. 
In short, then, my thesis: Klarman’s past scholarship posts an 
open invitation to Americans to get serious about ditching the 
Constitution from the conduct of our politics—or at least (a 
needed qualification, as we will see below) the Constitution’s 
substantive parts, the parts that set restrictions or requirements 
on the goals to be sought or effects to be wrought by exertions of 
state powers as distinct from parts laying down organizational and 
procedural forms for such exertions. The new book, I think, may 
be pulling back, inferentially, from that brink. 
But let us pause now to define more carefully some key terms 
in our discussion. 
II. FIDELITY AND ANTIFIDELITY 
A. “CONSTITUTION” 
In the senses that concern us here, “fidelity” is to a 
constitution, and a “constitution” is an interpretable, objective, 
verbal artifact of basic law. “Artifact” means it is fashioned in 
historical time for the country whose constitution it is. “Verbal” 
means it is made up of words and sentences. “Basic law” means 
the words and sentences set terms of permission and validation 
for any and all subsequent acts of lawmaking or legal 
administration in the country at hand. 
“Objective” means this prescriptive text is the same to all 
observers. It means people can point to this text, show it to each 
other, all easily agreeing that yes, that is the Constitution. (So all 
can immediately see and agree, for example, that “No state shall 
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts” is a part of this 
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country’s constitution.)23 “Interpretable” means the 
constitutional text connects with its relevant audience—fits into 
its cultural context—in such a way that debates about its correct 
applications (as distinct from guidance elsewhere obtained) will 
be or will feel, for that audience, persuasively decidable by 
argument. The words and phrases composing the mandates may 
appear as more or less open-ended, abstract, ambiguous, vague, 
arcane, or otherwise contestable in concrete application. But 
however seemingly contestable the applications may be, the 
constitutional text presents itself to its audience (deluded on this 
point as the audience may or may not be) as receptive to duly 
informed and reasoned argument, with a view to possible 
agreement, over what actions or courses of action do or do not fall 
within its mandates. (Note that this condition can hold in the sight 
of interpretive theories that allow for appeal to reasons beyond 
the text, as long those are treated as reasons about how to read the 
text, not as reasons having force (so to speak) on their own.)24 
A constitution thus—now to finish off the definition—
preexists its applications. However freely alterable it might be, 
however weak its amendment rule, there are intervals of time 
between changes. The constitution at any given instant is caught 
in one of those intervals, fixed and binding as it then stands on 
actions then occurrent. A constitution—just in order to be one—
must, to that liminal extent, have the property sometimes decried 
as entrenchment25 and sometimes explained as precommitment.26 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
 24. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR 
MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 22, 80–81 (2015) (describing a 
“philosophical” mode of fidelity in which judges seek out the “true meaning” or “best 
account” of “constitutional commitments” often “phrased” as “referring to general goods 
and principles,” and calling this “a kind of textualism”). 
 25. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment 
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 508–09 (1997) [hereinafter Klarman, Majoritarian] (“If a 
present majority is bound by the constitutional handiwork of a past majority until it can 
assemble the supermajority necessary to secure constitutional change, then we have 
cross-temporal entrenchment, which is inconsistent with the democratic principle that 
present majorities rule themselves.”). 
 26. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 235–36 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 
1988). 
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B. “FIDELITY” 
A political culture’s trait of constitutional fidelity (hereinafter 
often just “fidelity”) is its convergence and reliance on this idea 
of an interpretable verbal object setting terms of validity for acts 
of lawmaking and legal administration.27 It is the culture’s 
predilection to insist that the country’s officers and lawmakers, 
without exception—the President, the Congress, their 
counterparts in the fifty states, and thence on down—stand under 
obligation of submission to this publicly identifiable body of 
interpretable norms for the conduct of their business and that of 
the government. Officials thus are denied permission ever to set 
these constraints aside on the spot, no matter how good and 
strong the reasons they may sometimes perceive for doing so. 
They will be censurable as somehow miscreant—as lawless, 
disloyal, faithless to trust—insofar as they fail or refuse to submit 
themselves to the Constitution’s constraints, construed and 
applied by them in good faith.28 
C. “ANTIFIDELITY” (AND WHAT IT IS NOT) 
Resistance to that cultural predilection is the stance of 
Antifidelity. Antifidelity reflects and flows from suspicion or 
conviction that our country’s governance would be morally and 
practically improved—more in line with true political values, 
more respectful of ordinary people, more responsive to popular 
opinion and preference, defter at solving problems and setting 
policy—if Americans could somehow teach themselves to 
“systematically ignore the Constitution”29 or to cast aside “the 
entire enterprise of seeking constitutional meaning.”30 Note that 
Antifidelity thus stands opposed to calls for “popular” 
constitutionalism.31 The latter evince a preference for populist 
 
 27. See J. M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1997) (“Within our legal culture the idea of constitutional 
fidelity is seen as pretty much an unquestioned good.”). 
 28. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: The Judicial 
Duty of Good-Faith Constitutional Construction, GEO. L. SCHOLARLY COMMONS, 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1946, at 3–4 (urging that judges may 
properly engage in constitutional construction, fashioning law in accord with the spirit of 
the clause when the words are underdeterminative, as long as they do “conscientiously,” 
aiming in good faith “to follow the instructions given them in ‘this Constitution’”). 
 29. SEIDMAN, supra note 18, at 5. 
 30. Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1466, 1476 (2006). 
 31. See LARRY D. KRAMER, “THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES”: POPULAR 
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over elite forums to decide on the correct applications of 
constitutional constraints, but still in “a constitutional system that 
[is] self-consciously legal” and binding as such on acts of public 
officials.32 The Antifidelity position, by contrast, is that it would 
be better were such questions not to be raised at all in any 
forum—that Americans have no good reason for wishing their 
lawmakers and other officials to worry in the least about whether 
their acts and policies are or are not in accord with the 
Constitution. 
I need now also to mention, before moving on, three other 
things that Antifidelity is not, or at least could not be and still 
contain the thought of Michael Klarman. 
1. Not antipositivism 
Klarman has accepted the need of a representative-
democratic political order—or indeed of any project of social 
ordering by law—for an establishment of “background rules” to 
“establish the criteria for valid legislation.”33 But of course this 
rule-of-recognition excuse for constitutional law34 covers only, as 
Klarman has also pointed out, a highly truncated sort of 
constitutionalism. It does not in itself reach to entrenchment in 
constitutional law of “substantive standards against which 
otherwise constitutional practices must be tested.”35 What results 
is that “Antifidelity” for Klarman is fully satisfied by overthrow 
of our sense of subjection to substantive constitutional law, but 
still with retention of mandatory attention to some part, at least, 
of structural constitutional law. 
 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 32. Id. at 30. 
 33. Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 183. In a federal system, the 
category of needed background rules would cover not only the forms for election of federal 
officials and enactment of federal laws but also the rules for deciding the relative priorities 
of federal and state laws in cases of conflicts. See also id. at 184 (accepting the choice to 
put these rules in a constitutional writing, while pointing out that the purpose can be served 
while leaving them to oral tradition). 
 34. I take that description from Klarman, who here follows the well-known account 
in Hart’s The Concept of Law. See id. at 145, 183 & n.210 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 100–10 (1961)). 
 35. Id. at 183. 
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2. Not mere constitutional fault-finding: “derogation” and 
“repair” 
As we saw above, Antifidelity is a big step beyond 
constitutional fault-finding, even beyond the most adamant 
refusal to endorse the Constitution in force as one that could be 
found truly fit to serve as the country’s governing basic law. 
Suppose you hold to the latter view. Caught in a prevailing 
political culture of fidelity, what path of remedy would you choose 
to pursue? 
We have already before us the major choice you face. One 
option is the path of opposition against that very culture of 
fidelity. Your aim then is to bring down the Constitution (its 
substantive parts, anyway) to the status of derelict on the waters 
of the law, ceasing to make any final difference in the conduct of 
the country’s affairs. You would be seeking, in other words, a 
political-cultural condition in which lawmakers and other officials 
can never-mind the substantive Constitution at zero cost in social 
disapproval. Call this the remedial path of derogation from 
fidelity, or sometimes in what follows “derogation” for short. 
Your wish could also, though, be for a quite different and 
indeed contrary remedial path—the path (as we have called it) of 
constitutional repair, hereinafter sometimes simply “repair.” You 
seek an ongoing process of removal or correction of the 
Constitution’s faults while still upholding, in the meantime, 
fidelity to it. Repair would be your preference over derogation in 
case you saw as prohibitive certain major collateral costs or 
risks—say, of Caesarist rule or political breakdown—in trying to 
move along now without a supposedly binding constitution in 
force. I will return briefly later on to this question of comparative 
risks. For now, assume with me that risks from derogation are 
counted as substantial. 
So then there we are. Your assignment of a failing grade to 
the Constitution as it stands might issue in a call either for 
derogation or, alternatively, repair. (“Repair” is always here 
meant to imply “without derogation yet.”) A call for repair is thus 
not tantamount to a cry against fidelity. Bearing these points in 
mind, many readers may share my own sense (and Klarman’s, 
too) that the full-bore Antifidelity stance, the call for a full and 
immediate suspension of the American political habit of 
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obeisance to the Constitution, is truly radical, rarely met on the 
American academic scene.36 
Is The Framers’ Coup intended, and is it serviceable, as a full-
bore Antifidelity brief, a call for release of American politics from 
any and all sense of answerability to substantive constitutional 
constraints? 
III. KLARMAN’S OLDER SCHOLARSHIP AND THE 
FRAMERS’ COUP COMPARED 
It turns out, interestingly, that some kinds of constitutional 
fault-finding point more insistently than others toward the more 
radical remedy of derogation from fidelity, and that a sorting of 
complaints into those two piles—“requires derogation,” 
“receptive to repair”—corresponds with a marked difference in 
emphasis and focus between Klarman’s older scholarship and The 
Framers’ Coup. Where the older work is strongly centered on a 
complaint of constitutional-legal entrenchment that only an 
overthrow of the substantive constitutional traces can cure, the 
newer book has very much and maybe foremost on its mind a 
desanctification of the Framing, thus removing or reducing an 
obstacle that Klarman might see standing in the way of present-
day movement toward a major constitutional fix-up. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL FAULTS AND THEIR FIXES (EXTREME 
NUTSHELL EDITION) 
Complaints against the Constitution’s fitness as it stands to 
serve as American democracy’s basic law can refer either to the 
Constitution’s content or to some past process of events by which 
that content was fixed. Complaints against content can go either 
to form or to substance. On the side of form we may see a concern 
about abstraction running to vagueness. Too many clauses, the 
complaint would run, use language that can be read to say just 
about anything anyone might ever want to make it say—no doubt 
unavoidably in the reach for wide acceptance but still turning 
fidelity into an instrument of manipulation of our politics by 
illusive deployments of constitutional arguments. (We should 
 
 36. See Frank I. Michelman, Why Not Just Say No: An Essay on the Obduracy of 
Constitution Fixation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1143, 1149–52 (2014) (explaining and documenting 
this claim); Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 18, at 382 (“[T]he anticonstitutionalist 
approach has obvious (or at least apparent) costs, which most scholars seem unwilling to 
bear.”). 
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here recall Coup’s parting protest against use of the Constitution 
in the defense of interests that could not prevail in a straight-out 
merits argument.) For those who subscribe heavily to the 
vagueness complaint, release from fidelity (equivalently, a purge 
of all substantive content from the Constitution) must figure as 
the only plausible cure. 
Once beyond vagueness, constitutional content may be found 
defective by reason of conflict with preferred values and ideals (in 
this Constitution, the right to bear arms, for some) or mechanical 
or practical malfunction (the electoral college, for some). 
Objections of these kinds are curable by repair. Holding to them 
does not yet commit you to the cause of Antifidelity, which could 
well strike you as overkill depending on how you sorted out and 
weighed the prospects and risks of either remedial course. 
We turn to faults of origin, defects in the process of 
Constitution-creation. You have just read through The Framers’ 
Coup, let us say, and your faith in the Constitution’s presumptive 
soundness for present use has been shaken by facts presented 
there. This new learning of yours could work in tandem with 
content-based discontents you already held, to stir you into a 
drive for major constitutional repair work. With vision cleared by 
the newly presented evidence, you are now disposed to agitate for 
a constitutional convention, although not yet for suspension of 
fidelity.37 
There remains for mention one further major ground for 
Antifidelity, one that it seems must apply to any possible 
 
 37. Might you possibly conclude that the process of the Constitution’s creation was 
so irrational or arbitrary, so devoid of public motivation and public reason, so deviant from 
procedural norms of legitimate lawmaking—fair inclusion of affected constituencies, 
transparency, legality—as to forfeit any claim to the character of publicly binding law by 
which any body of citizens could rightly purport to constrain any other body? If so, then 
that might strike you as a ground of objection—you would call it the Constitution’s natal 
lack of legitimacy as law—for which, you might think, only derogation from fidelity to it 
could serve as an adequate remedy. I will not here say more about this possibility, because 
Michael Klarman has himself disavowed it as a part of a case against fidelity today. He has 
rather allowed that a natal lack of legitimacy can be, and in American history has been 
cured by subsequent widespread acceptance in fact of the Constitution as American basic 
law. See p. 313: “In the end, the charge of procedural irregularity would have to be 
adjudicated by the people. What would they [at the ratification stage and thereafter] make 
of the Constitution written for them in Philadelphia?”; Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra 
note 17, at 184–85 (“[O]ur Constitution plainly was, at its inception, an illegal document. 
Yet arguments to this effect today would get one nowhere in public debate, much less in a 
court of law. The reason is that the ultimate rule of recognition is public acceptance.” 
(citations omitted)) 
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constitution. We have called it the objection of entrenchment. 
Entrenchment—the constitution’s character of antecedent 
bindingness until changed on political actions “under” it—is the 
indispensable core of constitutionalism, every constitution’s 
indelible original sin. If you hold to the view of the absolute non-
acceptability of any subjection of the choices of current political 
majorities to the dictates of an antecedently binding law, then this 
essential feature of any constitution worthy of the name will 
supply for you the ground of a fully adequate case against fidelity. 
It will, moreover, be a ground that no sort of constitutional repair 
can cure.38 Antifidelity will be the only way out. 
From the preceding brief survey, it seems we can draw the 
following takeaway. Out of various possible heads of complaint 
against our Constitution’s worthiness to govern on the current 
American political scene, we have turned up two for which only 
derogation from fidelity could possibly serve as a cure. They are 
(1) susceptibility of unavoidably indeterminate constitutional 
clauses to prevaricative deployments in political argument, and 
(2) antecedent bindingness on rule by current majorities. All 
other objections concerning current content or process of 
formation can possibly be addressed by repair. We can put these 
observations to use in some comparisons between Klarman’s 
prior scholarship and his work in The Framers’ Coup. 
B. THE PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP 
A few representative quotations tell most of the story. First 
as applied to the Constitution of the United States: 
Why would one think, presumptively, that Framers who lived 
two hundred years ago, inhabited a radically different world, 
and possessed radically different ideas would have anything 
useful to say about how we should govern ourselves today? 
This is the famous dead-hand problem of constitutionalism: 
Why should today’s generation be ruled from the grave?39 
 
 38. Subject to certain reservations regarding the need for sufficient precision in 
expression, Klarman’s prior scholarship accepted as “justifiable on majoritarian grounds” 
a living majority’s right and power to subject itself (but not any posterity) to basic-law 
restraints against future temptations to act politically against, for example, freedom of 
expression. See Klarman, Majoritarian, supra note 25, at 507–08. I will not deal further here 
with this wrinkle in the antientrenchment position staked out in the prior scholarship. 
 39. Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 18, at 381; see authorities cited in note 4, supra. 
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Then as applied to any and all possible constitutions: “The 
problem of cross-temporal majorities renders suspect all of 
constitutionalism.”40 “Dead hand” and “entrenchment” are 
Klarman’s twin names for this objection to the subjection of a 
current political representative majority to an antecedently 
binding law. And since subjection to rule by freewheeling judges 
is no more democratically acceptable than subjection to rule by 
dead framers, Antifidelity beckons as the way to avoid either. 
Such is the central burden and drumbeat message of the older 
scholarship. The rest goes largely to rebuttal of attempts to evade 
or override the objection to entrenchment. (I do not thus mean to 
make light of this work, which is formidable, resourceful, and 
enlightening.) Among the failed evasions, in Klarman’s view, are 
ideas of the Constitution’s origin as an autonomous act of 
authorship by the people of the rules for their own political life,41 
and then of its susceptibility to cross-generational updating 
whether by non-formal amendment42 or by interpretation.43 
Among the failed attempts at override are ideas of the Founding’s 
claim to some “special normativity” that would warrant our 
subjection to its wisdom;44 of the containment within the very idea 
of democracy of a commitment to protection of minority rights;45 
and of a people’s paramount need for preservation of their sense 
of identity and integrity over time,46 for a symbolic expression of 
“national unity,”47 for a common platform for civic education,48 or 
for a fallback law by which to settle otherwise intractable political 
disputes.49 
C. NORMATIVE TRACES IN THE FRAMERS’ COUP 
The prior work of Klarman’s we have just been reviewing is 
legal scholarship distinctly of the type called “normative” (not 
always with intention of endearment), composed of arguments 
 
 40. Klarman, Majoritarian, supra note 25, at 509. 
 41. We can subsume here both of what Klarman calls the “agency” and 
“precommitment” accounts of constitutionalism. See Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra 
note 17, at 146, 152. 
 42. See Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 18, at 387. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 160. 
 46. See id. at 163 (naming this the “continuity” justification). 
 47. Id. at 169. 
 48. See id. at 175. 
 49. See id. at 179 (calling this the “finality” justification). 
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about what sorts of laws we should and should not be trying to 
make, enforce, or obey. In The Framers’ Coup, by contrast, 
objective historical-factual accounts come front and center, with 
normative insertions few and far between. On the question of a 
choice between derogation and repair as courses of response to 
the Constitution’s defects, the import of these few remarks is 
uncertain, but on balance they point, as I think, toward repair. 
We can start with that introductory battery of leading 
questions to which we have already twice paid heed: 
How ought one to think about [constitutional] provisions 
continuing to bind Americans today despite their inconsistency 
with modern democratic norms? More generally, how should 
one feel about a modern democratic society’s being governed 
by a [virtually non-amendable] constitution that was written 
225 years ago by people possessed of very different 
assumptions, concerns, and values [from those today 
prevailing]? (pp. 9-10) 
What is the controlling objection there? Is it the bare fact of 
entrenchment, pointing to derogation from fidelity as the only 
sufficient remedy? Or is it anachronism, fixable by repair 
(including of the amendment rule to assure better updating going 
forward)? 
From there we can skip to the end, the book’s parting shot to 
which we have also adverted above: 
In the final analysis, the Constitution—like any governmental 
arrangement—must be defended on the basis of its consistency 
with our basic (democratic) political commitments and the 
consequences that it produces. That it has been around for a 
very long time or that its authors were especially wise and 
virtuous should not be sufficient to immunize it against 
criticism. . . . As Jefferson would have recognized, those who 
wish to sanctify the Constitution are often using it to defend 
some particular interest that, in their own day, cannot be 
adequately justified on its own merits (p. 631). 
That is where Klarman leaves us. He tells us there the two 
sole bases on which we ought alone to think of defending the 
Constitution, if defend it we will—those being (1) consistency (or 
not) with current commitments and (2) consequences of 
submission. As between defending or not, though, how then shall 
we decide? Not, Klarman tells us—and this surely is the chief 
advisory burden of his book’s account of the Constitution’s 
history of origination—on the basis of adulation of the Framing. 
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And if we try to get beyond that “not?” Then, I think the key word 
in Klarman’s advice must be “consequences.” 
Defense of the Constitution, if that will be your choice, 
carries the consequence that then we must act politically in the 
mode of fidelity to it, despite doubts we might have about the 
fitness of its content to our values and needs, and furthermore 
despite the dangers from prevaricative deployments of the 
Constitution in political argument. But the opposite choice, for a 
dissolution across our country of the culture of constitutional 
fidelity, has consequences also, and Klarman must be read, I 
think, to mean that those, too, will have to be weighed in any 
choice about “defending” the Constitution or not. 
That brings me, then, to one more normatively suggestive 
passage to which I want to call attention. The Framers’ Coup 
carries what might almost be called a kind word from Klarman 
toward judge-led engineering of constitutional reconstruction, as 
enabled by the indeterminacy of application of some key 
constitutional clauses. Klarman recalls the great shift in judge-
declared constitutional-legal doctrine brought on by New Deal 
responses to the Great Depression. There then occurred, he 
writes, a “revolution” in constitutional law but “without any 
formal constitutional amendments to authorize it” (p. 624). And 
that, he adds, is “as it should be: Every generation must govern 
itself” (p. 624) and the barriers posed by Article V have prevented 
the generations from doing so by formal amendment. But “govern 
itself” here seems somehow to have merged with government by 
judiciary. Through gates of ambiguity the Framers luckily left 
open, judges ride to the rescue—not all on their own, of course, 
FDR plays his part—but still a key force in the array. “Without 
the open texture of the constitutional provisions [in question] and 
the Supreme Court’s latitudinarian interpretations of 
congressional power,” Klarman rounds off this passage in his 
book, Americans would had have little choice but to “scrap” the 
Constitution as of “antiquarian interest” only (p. 624). 
Now, to be sure, Klarman is not here out advocating loudly 
on behalf of freewheeling judicial constitutional reconstruction as 
the first choice of a democracy for basic-law updating. And yet it 
seems his opposition to that prospect may have softened, to a 
degree, by comparison with some earlier positions. Rescue by 
judges now is expressly noted by him as a possible path of escape 
from possibly lethal civic breakdowns, for the availability of which 
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Americans have had reason to be grateful. And grateful, indeed, 
precisely because their only other option would have been a 
“scrapping” of the Constitution—the same outcome, it seems, 
under a different name, as the one at which Antifidelity points. 
What it all comes down to seems to be this. There may be times 
when we (Klarman along with the rest?) will see the path of high-
handed judicial rewrites of constitutional law as less bad than 
further endurance of dangers to the commonwealth and less bad, 
too, than the “scrapping” alternative.50 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is from Klarman’s prior scholarship that I draw that 
trilemmatic casting of the question. We choose one from among 
three options: dead-handed rule from the Framers, anachronistic 
and democracy-flouting; high-handed rule from the judges, erratic 
and democracy-flouting; or else rejection altogether of pretense 
of constitutional fidelity. The overt leaning of Klarman’s thought 
was that among those options the third, Antifidelity, was the least 
bad. Granting what he (somewhat teasingly) called “obvious (or 
at least apparent) costs, which most scholars seem unwilling to 
bear,” that choice seemed to him the only one loyal to an 
overriding American commitment to democracy, if that is what 
we really meant to sustain.51 The Framers’ Coup, I have been 
saying, seems to me to carry signs of a diminished readiness on 
Klarman’s part to make a like declaration now. 
If so, is there anything we can say about why so? We can 
speculate about whether some part of a cause might lie in 
Klarman’s experience in researching and writing The Framers’ 
Coup, digging out and pondering his facts and then writing up the 
results in historical-narrative form. Traveling thus day to day and 
 
 50. For Klarman this might hold all the more so given his view, already at work in 
the prior scholarship and much amplified in his three intervening book-length works of 
American constitutional-legal history, that “judicial review has only marginally 
countermajoritarian potential [because judges] are part of society, and thus are unlikely to 
interpret the Constitution in ways that radically depart from contemporary popular 
opinion.” Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 192; see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2004). 
 51. Klarman, Antifidelity, supra note 17, at 382–83. 
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hand in hand with the Framers, reliving with them their quest for 
unity, their horror of breakup—their willingness, then, to bend on 
principles, yield on interests, gamble on artifice and abstraction— 
perhaps has had its effect. The Framers’ doggedness in the search 
for solutions that all the main constituencies could live with 
(deficient as were their imaginings of constituencies who counted) 
might register with us as their generation’s anticipation of an 
incessant deep problem of togetherness, for the management of 
which Americans have come to depend on a faith in the 
Constitution. 
A highly diverse and broadly free society like ours seeks 
constantly its basis for civic unity. We may wish for that basis not 
to be visceral only. We may rather hope for something more 
discursive, more grounded in reasons we can talk about, as a 
marker for the regime’s continued wide acceptability overall. The 
terms of that discursive marker—not all, but some key ones—
would have to be sufficiently abstract to evade foreclosures of 
matters of moral or practical moment on which agreement does 
not yet exist throughout the constituencies. Call that marker, as 
Seidman has suggested, a “common vocabulary for our 
disagreements,” a “site for contestation” if not a “source for 
answers;” call it, as Levinson does (or once did, before he took 
back his John Hancock) the sign of our mutual engagement to 
“take political conversation seriously.”52 Just as such and as 
nothing more, the Constitution still may serve as our society’s 
sovereign reminder and pledge for the project of civic union. 
Mark Tushnet puts it well: As long as we are able, by social 
observation or convention, to identify some body of principles as 
our country’s fundamental law, “vigorous disagreement over what 
those principles mean for any specific problem of public policy 
does not mean we as a society have no fundamental law in 
common.”53 
Of course, we would not necessarily have to treat the 
mandates, such as they are, of this agreed contestation site as laws 
in the ordinary sense, to be judicially policed and enforced. But 
still court-like institutions could possibly play a useful part in the 
process—serving as trusted interlocutors, even as provisional 
 
 52. SEIDMAN, supra note 18, at 142; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
193 (1988). 
 53. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 14 
(1999). 
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referees for constitutional debate, without trying or pretending to 
be the sole or final deciders. And again of course (and as Michael 
Klarman might be the first to point out) you do not necessarily 
need a codified “constitution” to fill this public space of a loose 
but still binding discursive convention.54 But a codified 
constitution might be what has, in fact, come in your country to 
occupy this space in civic life. If that were in fact the case, you 
might think twice about issuing calls for its displacement, faulty as 
it presently surely is, before you had the replacement for it 
securely in hand. 
Be all of that as it may: Insofar as The Framers’ Coup might 
by anyone be read as a brief in support of political action toward 
any Constitution-related end, the book’s clearest implicit call is 
for constitutional repair. Levinsonian agitation for a new 
constitutional convention can certainly make good use of it. 
Boosters of wide-bodied judicial constitutional reconstruction 
need not be overly cowed by it. For the cause of clear-sighted 
American historical self-understanding, The Framers’ Coup 
deserves to be everywhere. For the cause of Antifidelity, it is 
neither here nor there. 
 
 
 54. Cf. Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 184 (“In other regimes, 
tradition and custom establish the rule of recognition.”). 
